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Equality in Language 
Aspects of the Theory of Linguistic Equality 
Peter Griffiths 
Abstract 
This dissertation is an essay about the assumptions that make the systematic study of 
language possible. It attempts to refine and make expHcit ill-defined ideas which 
underpin the most fruitful developments in modern linguistics. It charts the evolution 
of the concept of linguistic equality and its significance in many branches of study; 
and it tries to elaborate and sophisticate an analysis of the implications of the idea. 
It attempts to test several hypotheses: that, at some point in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, linguistic equaUty became "an idea whose time had come"; that the 
idea became a covert hegemonic concept and a necessary if insufficient precondition 
for all thinking and research about language. 
There is no pretence that definitive answers have been given; only a hope that 
interesting and worthwhile questions have been asked. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Prophecy without honour: the idea and ideal of equality 
Superficially, human beings are extremely dissimilar. Some are young, some old; 
some female, some male; some light-skinned, some dark. Every human that has ever 
lived has been distinguishable from every other human by appearance, by voice, by 
fingerprints, and so on. In character, too, huge extremes of behaviour are well known, 
from the kindliest and most patient to the cruellest and most beUigerent. 
Vested interests of all kinds - ethnic, regional, national and commercial - have long 
played on these superficial and highly observable differences for their own question-
able purposes. Yet at all times, there have not been lacking visionaries who could see 
beyond merely shallow and deceptive appearances. For closer and better-informed 
examination revealed far more enduring and significant similarities between all 
human beings. In the past 200 years, and more especially since the American and 
French Revolutions, more and more people have come to accept the fundamental 
unity and sameness of the human race. Many have striven (so far with hmited success 
and many setbacks) to transform this profound insight into a permanent state of 
society, in which human rights and dignity are recognised as an embodiment of this 
basic human equality. Further, we could say that, in 1990, we have to recognise our 
own equality or perish amidst wars and the fouling of the earth. 
Superficially, languages are extremely dissimilar too. To the speaker of one language 
others are unintelligible streams of sounds, without shape or sense. Presently there 
are about 4500 different languages, the majority mutually incomprehensible. Grad-
ually, however, many scholars have come to feel that there is a fundamental level in 
which all languages are the same. Indeed, if human beings (beneath the baffling 
intricacy of appearances) have the same essential qualities and natures, why should 
language, a quintessentially human characteristic, not partake of this essential unity? 
The assertion of the essential or fundamental sameness or similarity of languages has 
taken many forms. To some it has appeared in the limitation of, say, the number of 
phonemes which are thought to constitute the basic building blocks for the sound 
system of all languages. For others it has often been a matter of finding universal 
meanings and intentions that are believed to underlie the thoughts expressed by 
language. For others still it has been a question of isolating the rules which are thought 
to provide a common basis for our ability to acquire, understand and produce 
language. And for others again it has been a matter of building a universal interna-
tional language out of those that already exist. 
Throughout recorded history, the assertion of human and now hnguistic equality has 
been the task of a minuscule minority: prophets without honour, usually pilloried and 
persecuted as cranks by the purveyors of conventional wisdom. In the last few 
centuries, however, the tide has begun to turn. An ever-accumulating mass of inesca-
pable evidence grows apace in the natural and social sciences; and this evidence 
suggests that the hitherto despised view is actually consonant with everything our best 
knowledge tells us about the world. Whether the "truth" about equality can survive 
becoming an orthodoxy is another matter; there is still far to go. 
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Another highly significant feamre of egahtarian ideology since Rousseau has been its 
tendency to favour diversity. A belief that humans are equal has not, generally, been 
construed to mean that they are exactly the same, or ought to be made to conform to 
one standard. Indeed, with some serious lapses (of which the Soviet Union has 
furnished the grossest example) egalitarians have tended to be at the forefront of the 
struggle for human rights and freedoms. And these can never mean anything unless 
they include the right to think, speak and act differently from each other. 
Likewise, some linguistic egalitarians have (often implicitly) been at pains to stress 
that their concerns include most of language rights and language variety. In part this 
springs from the fundamental hberal belief that no individual should be deprived of 
something they wish to retain, unless the survival of the human race (or at least of 
other individuals) may be said to depend on such deprivation. But here a doubt enters. 
For while a belief in human equality might be said to entail, or at least imply, a belief 
in Unguistic equality, does commitment to linguistic equality entail devotion to 
perpetuating language diversity, as the proponents of linguistic human rights argue? 
Or does it rather push us in the "Esperanto direction". If individual languages do not 
(as egalitarians tend to think) uniquely preserve and carry cultural values; if, in other 
words, a language is not essential for the survival of a culture (and after all, Greek 
and Latin cultures have done pretty well without a living language), then may not the 
myriad of languages actually constitute a bar to human equality? The notion of 
linguistic equality may, like many other fruitful concepts, be highly paradoxical in its 
implications. 
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1.2. The Theory of Linguistic Equality 
There should be good reasons for calling any idea a theory. It is employed here as a 
way of "interpreting, criticising and unifying established generalisations" (McLaugh-
lin 1987, p3). A theory should serve several purposes and possess various quahties. 
The first is the unifying and comprehendingpurpose. A theory reduces a bafflingly large 
amount of knowledge to manageable proportions, and thus makes it possible to 
organise data into meaning. The world is indeed blurred and thus unknowable without 
the simplifying and clarifying lens of theory. Secondly, theories help forecasting, and 
should assist us to create testable hypotheses which can embody further predictions. 
And thirdly, a theory should and must transform our understanding of what we think 
we know. They thus alter our relationship to the world and our idea of the world. In 
this sense, a theory is a prerequisite for both changing thinking and changing reality. 
A good theory should also have several qualities. The theory of linguistic equality 
should meet certain criteria for adequacy. It should be observationally adequate: that 
is, it should be able to indicate in what ways languages are "equal". It should be 
descriptively adequate if it can do this and, furthermore, tell us why these features 
should be considered to constitute equahty of languages. And, finally, it must be 
explanatorily adequate. That is, it must be able to explain why languages have acquired 
their egalitarian features, how such characteristics help us to understand languages 
generally, and how they may assist us in understanding the acquisition of language by 
children and aduhs (Radford 1988, p29-30). In some way, it should thus make sense 
of the past, present and future. 
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Next, a good theory should be enormously practical and reasonably simple. It should 
be fertile in its practical applications and implications. To be such it should be lucid 
but not dogmatic, strongly delineated but capable of adaptation and the absorption 
of new ideas and research. Because of this, it must contain empirical elements. For a 
theory possessed of potent political, social and moral implications must be clearly 
demarcated from wishful thinking and pipe dreams. Equality must be "out there," in 
the world and its multitude of languages, not merely a creation of fecund and 
overheated optimistic minds. Simplicity too is important to counterbalance such 
sanguine ideahsm. Negatively, the theory of linguistic equality should not be so 
over-elaborate as to allow incessant evasion of contrary evidence. 
Last, not least, and in keeping with most contemporary thinking in the social and 
natural sciences, our theory must be falsifiable. It must therefore be formulated in 
such a way that it admits of disproof, if not of proof. If it is worth it's salt, it will be 
both open to disconfirmation and be able to stand the test of searching and unfriendly 
examination. We cannot verify the proposition that one language is equal to another, 
despite the enormous balance of evidence; but we can refute the statement. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to pose stimulating questions, not to provide 
definitive answers. Tentatively, I think the theory of linguistic equality developed in 
the following section does meet, at least partially, the foregoing criteria; and the 
application of them will be briefly outlined in the conclusion. 
1.3. Defining the Elements of the Theory 
Although the theory of linguistic equality is in a sense very old, the formulation of it 
in logical, lucid and elegant terms is in its infancy. And the theory is protean. Some 
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might feel that it is not so much one theory as many. Here we shall rather say that 
there is, behind much of the thinking about language since the Enhghtenment, a 
mother theory which has given birth to several offspring. Some (like the notion of 
language universals) have become strong and independent - whilst others are still too 
attached to their parent to be considered autonomous. 
Equality is the state of being equal. Underlying and embodied in the usage since the 
1780s has been the notion, not of mathematical or surface identicality, but of fun-
damental similarity, or deep sameness. This is the sense in which the term will be 
employed here. 
Language is a more exacting definitional problem. It would be easy (indeed too easy) 
to think that the whole issue of language equahty could be shown to be a termino-
logical mirage called up by conflicting definition of language. Probably the most 
influential redefinition comes from Chomsky: "From now on I will consider a lan-
guage to be a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length and constructed 
out of a finite set of elements" (Chomsky 1957, pl3). But this definition does fly in 
the face of normal usage. The following may approach more closely what most 
language users actually consider language to be. Language is 
a) a system of sounds, words, patterns, etc. used by humans to communicate 
thoughts and feelings {Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 1988). 
b) "Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communi-
cating ideas, emotions and desires by means of voluntarily produced 
symbols" (Sapir 1921, p8). 
c) "A language is a system of arbitrary vocal symbols by means of which a 
social group co-operates" (Bloch and Trager, quoted in Lyons 1981, p4). 
d) A language is "the institution whereby humans communicate and interact 
with each other by means of habitually used oral-auditory arbitrary 
symbols" (Hall, quoted in ibid). 
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Sapir's definition (b) has two immense advantages. It does not tautologically presume 
language equality; and with the visionary foresight characteristic of this thinker it 
embraces the possibility that non-vocal, non-auditory systems hke sign language may 
be full and complete languages in their ovm right. 
Without unduly labouring a point prior to the presentation of evidence it does seem 
that none of these formulations, not even Chomsky's, absolutely presupposes equaUty 
in the sense of the latter term normally encountered in academic literature. Even the 
broadest assumption about structural properties, communicative function or cooper-
ative purposes does not presuppose equivalence in logicality, complexity and even 
less in expressiveness or cormnunicativeness. Yet, as we shall argue, it is actually these 
assumptions of equivalence (and even interchangeability) which actually account for 
any advances in thinking about language to which our century may lay claim. As we 
follow the tortuous road of linguistic thought, with its hairpins and cul-de-sacs, we 
shall notice a presence in the intellectual landscape. Whether the view of language 
be formalist or functionalist, rationalist or empiricist, and whichever definition of 
language we plump for, the reality of linguistic equality becomes incontestable. It is 
both the direction in which linguistic thought is tending and the principal cause of 
that movement. Linguistic equality is a "necessary truth" of the kind described by 
Leibnitz. Such a truth, 
"must have principles whose proof does not depend on examples, nor conse-
quently on the testimony of the senses, although without the senses it would 
never occur to us to think of them". 
1.4. A tripartite formulation. 
1. Formal "Primary" Equality: all languages are equally logical, rule-governed and 
complex. This implies: 
Introduction 
2. Functional "Secondary" Equality: all languages and varieties of languages are 
equally communicative, and equally capable of expressing any idea that can be 
thought. 
These two statements may lead to: 
3. Social and Moral Equality: all languages are of equal worth. 
The third assertion is of course ambiguous: in part it merely recapitulates what has 
been said in the first two: in part it dramatically extends it. This extension lies outside 
the scope of this work, though it will be alluded to on many points. For, although the 
three propositions, in my thinking, constitute a genuine trinity of truth about the real 
world, few would probably accept them. Most language users (at least in my straw 
poll of non-academics) actually think that languages are highly unequal in logicality, 
expressiveness and worth. When fused with immense social, pohtical, racial and other 
inequalities, such a disposition goes far towards explaining the remarkably unequal 
treatment that languages receive. The Unguist who accepts (as many implicitly do) 
the full theory of linguistic equality and yet defends unequal treatment of languages 
may well be guilty, if not of logical, then of psychological bad faith an "is" does not 
entail an "ought", but may imply one. But all this, alas, is the subject for another essay. 
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Chapter 2 
Language Equality in Linguistic Tlieory. 
The Adventures of an Idea. 
2.1. The late 20th Century consensus 
Ideas, like the idea that all languages are at some vitally profound level the same, do 
not spring fully accoutred from their creator's brains. It is probably true that the 
principal triumph of twentieth century linguistics has been to estabhsh (amongst a 
small and perhaps uninfluential band of academic linguists) that all languages are 
equal as languages (Hudson 1980, pl91). But the exact process by which this stage 
was reached remains, and perhaps forever will remain, unclear. My own behef, baldly 
stated, is that thinking about language is governed by what we may loosely term social 
forces. It certainly seems inconceivable that an idea Uke linguistic equality could ever 
have been conceived or articulated without historically prior notions of human 
equality, though these, often pushed underground, may well be coterminous with the 
history of the human race. 
BeUevers in primitive communism (as opposed the "sohtary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short" life that Hobbes believed the original humans to have lived) think that a high 
degree of social and personal equahty is "natural" in the earHest societies. And since 
human ideologies may mirror, as well as generate, social forms, we may speculate that 
the concept of human equality has a long, intricate and largely unknowable history. 
And perhaps the history of the concept of linguistic equality is equally long. In any 
case, to study ideas of any kind is an education in living with doubt, paradox and 
ambiguity. That early modern Europe (and its colonial offspring) could at once be 
the home and stamping ground for the recent elaboration of egalitarian ideals and a 
bitter antagonist and violator to those ideals is an uncomfortable contradiction. By 
the last decade of the twentieth century lip-service to the maxim of theoretical 
linguistic equality has acquired a truistic feel about it. Many general textbooks make 
obeisance to the dictum. Many formulations have been essayed. One is that languages 
are equal because they are all cognitively complex. A second, that they are all equally 
logical; a third, that they are all rule-governed; and a fourth, that they are all capable 
of expressing any idea that has ever been thought or could ever be thought. Another 
might be that the equality of languages resides in the fact that they can all generate 
an infinitude of sentences from a finite and hstable number of rules and lexical items. 
A sixth formulation concentrates on the impossibiUty of linguistic progress: there are 
no "primitive" languages, and therefore no demonstrable correlation between cultural 
development and linguistic sophistication, from rude barbarism to elegant 
complexity, or vice versa. 
A l l these formulations derive from ideas and assumptions about the intrinsic 
properties of languages themselves. A different perspective is gained if we focus instead 
on the capabilities of human beings. Since, arguably, language concerns the capacities 
of the mind, and all human minds, in their native potential, are equal, then linguistic 
equality may stem from this working hypothetical truth. And another perspective is 
provided by the intellectually ingenuous insistence that linguistics must be descriptive 
not prescriptive: this, it may be said, presupposes an equality, or at least an equal 
interest, in the languages to be analysed. To be sure there are divergences between 
those who feel that the equality of languages is demonstrable, or derivable from the 
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"facts" about language, and those who feel that equality is not so much an empirical 
finding, or a verifiable or falsifiable assertion, but an ideological statement, or an 
assertion of the null hypothesis. But despite differences like these, we find even the 
skeptical proponents of the latter position gravitating back to a moderate statement 
of linguistic equality (Milroy 1985, pl5). The whole notion has become very deeply 
embedded in the structure of thinking about language. 
2.2. Origins 
An ever-regressive quest for ideological origins is fraught with perils and may be 
futile. The history of linguistic thought has been bedevilled by both ethnocentric and 
glossocentric thinking - both incompatible with a beUef in linguistic equality and both 
intellectually disabhng. Here it must suffice to note that one diachronic strand which 
umavels towards an egalitarian position is the search for language universals. At the 
onset of the seventeenth century Roger Bacon wrote that "Grammar is substantially 
the same in all languages, even though they may vary accidentally" (Lyons 1968, p333). 
This marked a welcome escape from the tedious sectarian attempts to find universal 
origins of language, a recursive obsession of early thinkers. 
Traditional language education in Europe, both before and after Bacon's time, 
descended from the glossocentric work of Greek and Roman grammarians, 
exemplified best by Dionysius Thrax. Since these classically fossilised dead languages 
became marks of sacerdotal status and social exclusiveness, this spurious 
"universalism" served to underwrite destructive attempts to latinize EngUsh, and 
other bizarre prescriptive endeavours; a memorable example of dubious practices 
buttressed by erroneous theory. 
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Prescriptivism, essentially a form of linguistic anti-egalitarianism, enjoyed a long 
hegemony, founded largely on social, racial and ideological prejudice. Its demise, 
amongst serious students at least, was presaged by insights like Bacon's; and by the 
Jansenist Port Royal grammarians who partook of Cartesian rationahsm and were 
attracted by the notion of a universal thought structure common to human beings 
(Robins 1967, p l l6) . The knell of prescriptivism grows louder in Herder's famous 
essay of 1772 which argues for the inextricability of language and thought. Earlier 
thinkers, from Aristotle onwards, had assumed that language depended on prior 
cogitation and abstraction (op. cit. pl51). Given an interdependency of language and 
thought, the thought patterns of people should be studied through the mother tongue. 
By contrast, Herder maintained that language and thought advanced symbiotically, 
and were together the distinguishing mark of humanity. 
In a manner now familiar. Herder suggested a kind of human equipotentiahty for both 
thought and language. Language, he agreed with Siissmilch and the pervasive "divine 
origin" school, could not have been invented by humans. Without reason Adam (and, 
presumably. Eve too) could not have been taught language, not even by God. He 
continues: 
"Parents never teach their children language without the latter at the same 
time inventing it themselves. The former only direct their children's 
attention to the difference between things by certain verbal signs.... (and) 
by means of language only facilitate and accelerate for the children the 
rise of reason." 
Innatist hypothesis like this were of central importance to the growth and intellectual 
consolidation of the notion of linguistic equality, and to the steady extension of 
egahtarian ideals generally since the Enlightenment. Herder subscribed to a dubious 
monogenetic theory of language origins, but his argument for the universality of 
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human language rings down the years, and his notion that humans are, by nature and 
endowment, everywhere the same, leads straight to dangerously radical conclusions 
in both linguistics and politics (Fromkin and Rodman 1988, p26). 
But once again, ideas do not spring perfectly smooth and consistent from their 
creator's brains. Herder's work is still disfigured by the notion that "primitive" 
languages contain little abstract vocabulary and an inept granunatical structure: and 
it was not until as recently as 1972 that Labov finally demonstrated that not merely 
languages, but language varieties, are formally equal. More representative of much 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Unguistic thought is the lamentable and egregious 
Lord Monboddo, in whose writings non-empiricist and non-rationalist prejudices 
combine in a grotesque farrago of ethnocentrism. "Primitive" languages were said to 
be devoid of syntactic categories, lexically impoverished, and rule-less. Chinese was 
"exceedingly defective" and accounted for that peoples' philosophical backwardness! 
(op. cit. p59). 
Variations on these views remained popular among linguists until the twentieth 
century, and are still widely encountered among the population at large. It would be 
rash to assume that more than a fraction of the British population has, by 1990, 
assimilated any of the cluster of beliefs that make up the idea of linguistic 
egalitarianism. Indeed linguistic nationalism may well be more entrenched than other 
aspects of xenophobia. 
2.3. Rationalism, Romanticism and Historical Linguistics. 
Comparative and historical linguistics, beginning perhaps with Dante, was slow to 
erode the foundation of prejudice. Monogenetic thinking, closely linked to 
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Christianity and the attempt to prove that Hebrew was the universal linguistic 
ancestor, was occasionally attacked, as by Scahger in the sixteenth century. Four 
thinkers living and viTiting at the turn of the nineteenth century, Rask, Grimm, Bopp 
and von Humboldt mark the real begiimings of comparative and historical thinking 
about language and thus the substantial onset of egalitarian ideas in linguistics. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) in particular stressed the creative linguistic 
capacity innate in the mind of every speaker. Language was not a mere product, and 
speakers have infinite power over finite resources. From our late twentieth century 
standpoint von Humboldt's thinking was patchy, since he followed Herder in thinking 
that each language quintessentially expressed the individuality of every nation or 
ethnic group (Stern 1983, p247). Here the way was open for the development of a 
racial and national mysticism, in which the Nazis were the fittingly hideous climax. 
And von Humboldt thought that Sanskrit was the world's best developed language 
because of his preference for synthetic languages, with Chinese as the most isolating 
and therefore least developed. 
Nonetheless Chomsky was quite probably right in discerning in the Herder-von 
Humboldt tradition an acknowledgement of the value of cultural and linguistic 
diversity which has become the hallmark of the more consistent and serious form of 
linguistic egalitarianism. Von Humboldt, in particular, is seen as standing "directly in 
the crosscurrents of rationalist and romanticist thought and whose work is in many 
ways the culmination as well as the terminal point of those developments (Chomsky 
1966, p2). 
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On the other hand, a tendency to see developments in "scientific" thinking as 
necessarily marked by a growing proclivity towards "value-free" thinking is scarcely 
borne out by the story of comparative and historical Unguistics in nineteenth century 
Germany (the stamping-ground for thinking and research in that century just as 
America has been in ours). "Linguistic Darwinism" appropriated the more scientific 
side of Darwin's thinking and then suffused it with a great deal of anti-scientific and 
ahistorical thinking. This was highly ethnocentric and extremely anti-egalitarian, and 
led, inter aha, to the prediction that Indo-European languages would naturally and 
inevitably triumph in the survival of the linguistically fittest, a view that has 
disagreeably modern echoes in some of the modern proponents of various global 
languages. 
2.4. de Saussure and the Dawn of Modern Linguistics 
Perhaps the greatest single event which served as both a landmark and a pointer on 
the tortuous road to a securer conception of Unguistic equality, was the publication 
of Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de Linguistique Generale, published posthumously 
in 1916. Against the diachronic approach to language sponsored by the nineteenth 
century neo-grammarians, de Saussure stressed that a synchronic outlook could be 
both scientific and explanatory. Synchronic explanations were structural, historical 
ones causal. But here our interest Kes not so much in de Saussure as a formulator of 
structuralism but as the creator of the langue/parole distinction which has 
inadvertently played an intriguing part in egalitarian thinking in modern linguistics. 
While neo-grammarian historicism had often succumbed to the illusions of linguistic 
superiority, it was much less easy to think of languages, (or language varieties for that 
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matter) as inferior or superior when they were studied as "forme, non substance." 
Detached from the complexities of human (as well as linguistic) history and 
scrutinised descriptively as, say, a self-contained system of communication, it was far 
easier to view languages as equally worthy of study for their own sakes. And looking 
at linguistic competence of the speaker (langue) rather than the utterances of real 
speakers (parole) posed a degree of abstraction in each speakers linguistic knowledge 
which, irrespective of the rightness of de Saussure's ideas,,probably helped to liberate 
linguistics from the very serious influences of overt and covert ethnocentricism. 
Furthermore, de Saussure's focus was on the relative interactions between the 
components of linguistic thinking: like chess pieces and railway trains these are 
describable and comprehensive only within the totahty of the game of chess or a 
railway system. This approach helped clear the way for the examination of the 
relations between the elements in all languages that cannot be described in a 
judgementally hierarchical way. I f all languages are structures independent of the 
substance or medium in which they are bodied forth; if all languages are two-level 
systems of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations (Lyons 1981, p220); then 
"dispassionate" linguistic thinking about languages in general becomes not merely 
easier, but eventually inescapable. 
The apparent self-contradictoriness between Saussure's views that: 
(a) languages must be studied in abstraction from society and: 
(b) that languages are social facts. 
Or, to put it another way, that changes inlangue derive from changes individuals forge 
in their parole is less pertinent here than another of his guiding principles; that of the 
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arbitrariness of the linguistic sign (Varbitraire du signe) . Language systems which are 
external to individuals and constrain them, are semiotic systems in which the signified 
(le signifie) is arbitrarily associated with the signifie (le signifiant). It takes only a 
moment's reflection to grasp that this notion is highly corrosive to claims of linguistic 
superiority. 
Most twentieth century structuralism has, in a Saussarean way, been linked to a 
relativistic approach that springs from the idea of arbitrariness. The hypothesis, that 
is, that language universals do not exist except for such very general semiotic 
proprieties as arbitrariness (op. cit. p 17-24), productivity, duality and discreteness. 
My contention, however, is that both relativism and universalism were damaging to 
presumptuous claims to linguistic superiority. 
2.5. Language Destruction and the hey day of 
American Structuralism 
It is not a mere historical accident that the first effective practical demonstration of 
the notion of linguistic equahty (as expressed in 1.4.) occurred in early twentieth 
century America. For here, quite starkly, the lethal impact of an ethnocentric and 
self-confident European expansionism on technologically "backward" people was in 
grim evidence. And the contradiction between the European invasions and 
dispossessions, and the Rights of Man trumpeted in the American Declaration of 
Independence, eventually produced the remarkable investigations into indigenous 
Indian languages which played such an important role in American linguistics. Its 
monument is The Handbook of American Indian Languages, edited by Franz Boas 
and published between 1911 and 1922. 
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Both Boas and Sapir were anthropologists, and anthropology had long been bound 
up with "the expansion of European power and the conquests by the white man of 
other continents" in the Americas, Africa and Asia (Stern 1983, pl96). In contrast 
with much earlier anthropological writing, with its essentially teleological notions of 
human kind progressing, in Morgan's evolutionary trichotomy, through savagery, via 
barbarism, to civilisation. Boas insisted that each society, and its language, should be 
studied on its own terms, in its own social and historical enviroimient, and studied 
descriptively and empirically, avoiding the pitfalls of conjectures about language 
aetiology. There are, of course, very grave problems with this naive view, but it is at 
least arguable that it marked a necessary step towards a demonstration of language 
equality. But it certainly reveals an important paradox: it may be necessary 
(historically) to assume equahty (or something very like it) in order to "prove" it. 
American Indian languages had suffered grievously from the European colonial 
incursions of the seventeenth century onwards. By the latter part of the nineteenth 
century many small, weak and non-literate conmiunities were faced with language 
death beneath the juggernaut of an ever-moving frontier and the relentless pressures 
of cultural conformity. The egalitarian rhetoric of the American republic, though 
grown tawdry, resurfaced in the struggle against slavery. Human equality was 
proclaimed as a "self-evident" truth in the Declaration of Independence. Hence the 
radical anthropological programme of studying Indian languages from 
non-evolutionary assumptions. Margaret Mead, one of Boas' many influential 
students, wrote: 
"To get the depth of understanding he required meant submerging his 
thinking in that of another. It meant learning to think in anothers terms 
and to view the world through anothers eyes. The most intimate knowl-
edge of an informant's thought processes was mandatory and could only 
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be obtained by intensive work over a long period but Boas conceived 
of his main task as the adoption of an informant's mode of thought while 
retaining full use of his own critical faculties" (Mead, quoted in Stern 1983, 
pl97) 
This essentially empathic approach to descriptive language study appears 
incompatible with notions of a linguistic hierarchy in language evolution (though it 
does not rule out cultural or cognitive hierarchies). The work of Boas and his 
collaborators incessantly emphasised that, just as the anthropologist must learn to 
accept (or at least respectfully and peacefully coexist with) diverse and unfamiliar life 
styles, so she should accept diversity in language. The vocabulary, grammatical 
structures and syntax of Indian languages were quite different from those of 
Indo-European languages, and should be treated on their own terms, not as a 
degeneration from some prescriptive norm. In this fundamental sense. Boas' 
enterprise actually analysed languages as though they were equal, a landmark in 
linguistic enquiry. 
"No attempt has been made to compare the form of Indian grammars with 
the grammar of English, Latin or even among themselves: but in each case 
the psychological groupings which are given depend entirely on the inner 
forms of each language. In other words, the grammar has been treated as 
though an intelligent Indian was going to develop the forms of his own 
thoughts by an analysis of his own form of speech" (Boas, in Hymes 1964, 
pl23). 
2.6. Sapir and the Formal Equality of Language Systems 
This kind of formulation does not entirely avoid the charge of benevolent patronage, 
but does go a good way down the road towards an even-handed treatment of language 
in descriptive terms. Edward Sapir, Boas' pupil and a polymath whose figure still 
impressively bestrides the inter-war American linguistic scene, went a step further. 
In 1921, on the basis of empirical work, he declared that, as far as was known, there 
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was no justification for the concept of a primitive language (Sapir 1921, p8). And in 
his well-known article in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences he tellingly notes: 
"The gift of speech and a well-ordered language are characteristic of every 
known group of human beings. No tribe has ever been found which is 
without language, and all statements in the contrary may be dismissed as 
mere folklore. There seems to be no warrant whatever for the statement 
which is sometimes made that there are certain people whose vocabulary 
is so limited that they cannot get on without the supplementary use of 
gestures so that intelligible communication between members of such a 
group becomes impossible in the dark. The truth of the matter is that 
language is an essentially perfect means of expression and communication 
among every known people. Of all aspects of culture, it is a fair guess that 
language was the first to receive a highly developed form and that its 
essential perfection is a prerequisite to the development of culture as a 
whole" (Sapir 1963, p7). 
or again, even more eloquently 
"The outstanding fact about any language is its formal completeness. This 
is true of a primitive language like Eskimo or Hottentot as of the carefully 
recorded and standardised languages of our great cultures.... Each lan-
guage has a well-defined and exclusive phonetic system with which it 
carries on its work, and, more than that, all of its expressions, from the 
most habitual to the merely potential, are fitted into a deft tracery of 
prepared forms from which there is no escape....we may say that a language 
is so constructed that no matter what any speaker of it may desire to 
communicate, no matter how original or bizarre his idea or his fancy, the 
language is prepared to do his work. He will never need to create new 
forms or to force upon his language a new formal orientation - unless, poor 
man, he is haunted by the form feeling of another language and is subtly 
driven to the unconscious distortion of the one speech system on the 
analogy of the other" (ibid. pl53). 
Sapir continues in this powerfully original and persuasive vein. Parrying a familiar 
counter-thrust, he notes that "Formal completeness has nothing to do with the 
richness or poverty of the vocabulary." Kant's Critique of Pure Reason might very well 
be rendered into Eskimo or Hottentot since "there is nothing in the formal 
peculiarities of Hottentot or of Eskimo which would obscure the clarity or hide the 
depth of Kart's thought - indeed, it may be suspected that the highly synthetic and 
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periodic structure of Eskimo would more easily bear the weight of Kant's terminology 
than his native German" (ibid. pl54). 
I have, exceptionally, quoted Sapir at length to convey the generously polymathic 
nature of his writing. Interestingly, with his intense concern for the interplay between 
language and culture, he did not exphcitly repudiate one conceivable implication of 
linguistic equality: that, since all languages are linguistically equal, and all are equally 
good and expressive as intellectual media, then why not settle for one rather that the 
Babel of thousands? As an idealist and an internationalist, Sapir comments favourably 
on the "logical necessity" of an international language, attacking critiques of 
Esperanto as artificial, and defending such a second learned language as a "secondary 
form of speech for distinctly limited purposes" (ibid. p31). Since he was interested in 
speech as a societal bond, Sapir argued for an "international auxihary language of 
intercommunication which can be set aside for denotive purposes sure and simple." 
In arguing for the theoretical desirabiUty of such a language he developed another 
memorably coherent exposition of exactly what it is that makes languages formally 
comparable. Examining English from the standpoint of simplicity, regularity, logic, 
richness and creativeness, he launches a compelling attack on the folk myth that one 
language is any simpler, more regular or more logical than any other. And he 
strengthens his case by noting that richness ("all those local overtones of meaning 
which are so dear to the heart of the nationahst") would be furnished by "interaction 
of human beings who make use of the international medium" (ibid. 118). 
Dictates of Tradition and "irrational usage" preclude existing languages from creating 
new words and combination of words, and thus "No national language really 
corresponds to the analytic and creative spirit of modern times. National languages 
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are all huge systems of vested interests which sullenly resist critical enquiry" (ibid, 
p i 18). We need not follow Sapir further to appreciate the significance of these 
devastating thrusts at all varieties of hnguistic chauvinism. 
2.7. Bloomfield and Intra Lingual Equality 
To turn from Sapir to the other colossus of inter-war American linguistics, Leonard 
Bloomfield, is to enter a drier intellectual climate in which the fragrant breeze of 
humanism is stilled. Bloomfield's later inductive/mechanistic/behaviourist approach 
fell from fashion many years ago (though pedagogic methods based on it are 
amazingly resilient) but his Language - essentially a 1933 behaviourist 
reinterpretation of a work originally pubUshed in 1914 - is still perhaps the most 
influential book ever published on the subject. In terms of developing and refining 
the concept of linguistic equality (which I have argued was a necessary but insufficient 
prerequisite for serious theoretical movement in the discipline) Bloomfield's work is 
equivocal. Because of the fierce inductivism of his approach ("The only useful 
generahsations about language are inductive generalisations") (Bloomfield 193, p20) 
and because of his sense that empirical research into language was still in its infancy; 
he eschewed overt speculation about the nature of language. Thus language universals 
were abandoned,/7ro term, for an emphasis on the apparent diversity of languages. 
Because of this restriction on the scope and method of hnguistic enquiry (as part of 
a bid to establish linguistics as a natural science) many fruitful developments may 
have been blocked for many years by Bloomfield's vast and God-Hke authority. This 
was lamentable, as the method he confidently advocated (exemplified by the now 
hilarious stimulus, response and reinforcement analysis of Jack, Jill and the theft and 
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consumption of the forbidden apple in Ch.l) is now viewed as, at best, a confusing 
half-truth. In these respects, Bloomfield's influence may be seen as causing 
stagnation, even regression, in the history of linguistics. 
Yet this is not the complete picture. Bloomfield's assault on the snobbery of 
prescriptivism and insistence that all varieties of language may well be worthy of 
serious study should not be overlooked. There is actually a strand in Bloomfield which 
may be seen as descending from the American populist tradition. Even Bloomfield's 
creaky philosophy of language did depend (imphcitly) on a prior egalitarian 
assumption completely incompatible with his insistence that only what may be 
induced from observable data really merits scientific study. And the currency of his 
writings helped to make anti-prescriptionist intralingual egalitarianism academically 
respectable: for in academic terms, "worthy of serious study" may be taken to mean 
equal in potential theoretical significance. 
Language prescriptionism had always been powerful in the post-independence 
United States, though it was not unchallenged (Drake 1977, passim). Thus 
Bloomfield's protest against it, in the original 1914 version of his book, was especially 
notable, though it failed to gain credence outside narrow circles of linguists (Drake 
1977, p46) In the later edition Bloomfield extends his attack on the bastions of 
prejudice by a withering analysis of the logical oddity of the process of language 
standardisation (Bloomfield 1933, p48-56). And in the final chapter there is a 
comprehensive critical analysis of the psychology underpinning the readiness of 
people to be bluffed by grammarians in their hierarchic ordering of language 
varieties. Social insecurity is seen as the key to this trick: socially insecure people. 
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diffident about their speech (and nearly everyone is socially insecure at many points 
in their lives) fall easy prey to linguistic authoritarianism (ibid. p497). 
"For the native speaker of substandard or dialectal English the acquisition 
of standard Enghsh is a real problem, akin to that of speaking a foreign 
language.... Our schools sin greatly in this regard....the unequal distribu-
tion which injured him [the learner] in childhood is a fruit of the society 
in which he lives.... he should rather take pride in simplicity of speech and 
view it as an advantage that he gains from his non-standard background" 
(ibid). 
2.8. The Behaviourist Cul-de-Sac and the Way Out 
Bloomfield's spirited and polemical mauling of the "fanciful dogmas" of the guardians 
of correctitude in speech still convinces. But it is sorely ad hoc and superficial. 
Nowhere in the work does he address himself to the vital question of why language 
varieties (or languages themselves) are equally interesting, rewarding to study and 
worthy of preservation. Subsequent structuralists developed the notion that a 
language is esseiitially what the native speaker says it is, reaching a point of extremity 
which dismissed, not merely prescriptivism, but all language rules (and therefore 
abolishing the langue/parole distinction through the native speaker's infallibility) 
(Diller 1978, pl8). But Bloomfield merely assumes that "whatever is, is right;" all 
observable, surface features of any linguistic phenomenon are of broadly equal value 
in the study of a language. 
We are thus, by the extension of this style of thought, carried in an extremely 
un-egahtarian direction. The behaviouristic repudiation of the binding importance 
of the human mind, and the concentration on the alarming and possibly limitless 
diversity of surface features, leads us to a conclusion that languages are chaotic, and 
have nothing in common at all. But of course behaviouristic students of language in 
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reahty did assume some universals of language: for without these they could not even 
begin to study or describe languages. There is a yawning theoretical emptiness, and 
a regression from Sapir's insights, in the "pure" inductionist data-driven approach. 
The intellectual bankruptcy of extreme behaviourist thinking about the nature of 
language actually sprang from its repudiation of the notion of language equahty. 
Skinner's Verbal Behaviour (1951) was of course the work whose weakness finally bust 
the "strong" behaviourist paradigm. For Bloomfield's milder catholic and unrigorous 
version was supplanted by an arid orthodoxy in which fundamental questions were 
systematically avoided. Skinner's work thus constitutes the most powerful negative 
evidence for the thesis of this dissertation. Ultimately, it represented the suicide of 
thinking. Skinner, to whom such notions as the "essential" sameness of languages were 
trivial or meaningless, was forced to take refuge in the idea of a "verbal community" 
(Skinner 1957, p461). The human mind is now a tabula rasa in its initial state, with 
incoming data scribbling furiously away on it. Such a position leads, not merely to 
skepticism about any universals of language, but to doubt about whether any 
systematic study of it is possible at all. Had Chomsky not existed, it would have been 
necessary to invent him simply to ensure a rationale for the continuance of academic 
linguistics (Newmeyer 1980, p42) 
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Chapter 3 
Linguistic Equality Revived: 
Tlie Quest for Universals of Language 
3.1. Equality and Universality: 
The intimate yet difficult relationship between the twin ideas of equality and univer-
sality in language is manifest throughout the history of Unguistics. The search for 
universals has often been accompanied by an awareness of the many implications of 
cross-linguistic similarities for the very nature of language. Behaviourist structuralism 
repudiates this: languages could differ unpredictably and without limit. This assump-
tion, married to Bloomfield's rejection of the mind in linguistics, left a disciphne shorn 
of everything except field methods and descriptive methodologies: but even these 
depended on the existence of formal language universals like syntactic categories, 
universals of meaning as assumed by translation, and so on. Again, a degree of behef 
in some comparability, and, by implication, some language equality was a sine qua 
non of the most anti-theoretical descriptive study. 
Broadly speaking, the relevance of the search for typological universals (associated 
with Joseph Greenberg) and of Chomsky's U[niversal] G[rammar] to the concept of 
linguistic equality is this. Children and adults acquiring knowledge of language are 
subjected to an enormous range of linguistic environments. Some hear an incessant 
stream of language, much of it addressed to them. Others encounter exceedingly little. 
Unless we assume the existence of biologically determined principles which equip all 
human minds with a perfect and equal capacity for language acquisition, the absolute 
success of all "normal" children in attaining total command of their language variety 
(or varieties) by the age of 5 is completely incomprehensible. 
The (allegedly) data-driven Greenbergian universals are being incorporated into the 
framework of linguistics. The presuppositions of universal grammar have achieved 
an even greater hold on the way we think about language. Work in both areas lends 
handsome support to our central hypothesis. 
3.2. Typological Universality and Language Equality 
No classification of languages can be essayed at all unless they are comparable 
(Greenberg 1974, Ch.3). Comparability implies common quaUties, though these may 
be obscured by schema which divide languages into over-rigid groups, as with 
Schleicher's famous tripartite division into isolating, agglutinative and inflective (ibid. 
p20). Sapir's scaler approach emphasises connections, not divisions (Though his 
weltanshauung notion of language as expressing a people's spirit led him another way: 
ibid. pl5). Some structuralists stressed diversity, not similarity, but 
"the Prague school of structuralism insisted that, since language is not a 
collection of traits but a configuration in which tout a tient, it follows that 
there must be recurrent and law-like relations among the properties of 
language and such clusters define types" (ibid. p43) 
Clarification of these issues was unlikely while Bloomfield's dogma ("The only useful 
generaUsations about language are inductive generalisations") held sway. Charles 
Hockett's reformulation, in the early '60s, of these ideas was illuminating. Of course, 
universals must be actually "there" in languages, not mere fictions invented by 
linguists to satisfy a desire for regularity. Hockett notes that "the search for language 
universals" and "the discovery of the place of human language in the universe" are 
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actually different formulations of the same enquiry. He attempts a clarification of 
Bloomfield's "terse remark": 
"1.1 The assertion of a language universal must be founded on extrapola-
tion as well as empirical evidence" (Hocket, 'The Problem of Universals 
in Language" in Greenberg 1963). 
Because many natural languages are extinct, and some of these are unknowable, 
complete factual information about human language will be forever unattainable: a 
problem compounded by creolisation and language creation as well as language 
death. 
"1.2 The assertion of language universals is a matter of definition as well 
as of empirical evidence and extrapolation" (ibid. p3). 
Hockett was himself a structurahst, but here, while claiming merely to "expand" 
Bloomfield, he effectively demolishes his fragile "common sense" edifice. This was an 
important intervention and leads toward a redefined conception of the role of theory, 
and to a restructured notion of language equality qua theory. 
Hockett's other observations are equally pertinent: he had travelled far from the 
neogrammarians (who viewed language as a totality of individual items, each explic-
able in terms of historical process), and from early structuralism, which saw languages 
as organised synchronic systems, possessing unity but who tended to emphasise 
diversity at the expense of unity: Hockett takes us, unwittingly, a step nearer the 
approach of transformational grammar to language universals. Here language 
becomes a set of internalised rules rather than mere observations about surface 
phenomena; and also another step along a path which begins with linguistic equality 
(in all its senses) as an idea entertained (if at all) by cranks, to a plank in the platform 
of respectable mainstream thought. 
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The discovery that historically umelated languages (like English and Navaho) shared 
common features (if these are not merely adventitious) must mean that they share 
them because it is some kind of requirement of human language that they are there 
(Herbert H Clark and Eve V Clark, "Language Processing", in Greenberg 1978, Vol 
I , p229). Languages do not vary randomly and limitlessly: severe limits are placed on 
variation. These are the very features that fulfil the four conditions which a priori each 
human language must be capable of: 
1 Being learned by children (and adults) 
2 Being spoken and understood by adults easily and fluently 
3 Embodying the ideas people normally want to convey 
4 Functioning as a communication system in social and cultural settings (ibid. 
p28) 
We have now reached the confluence of several streams. American anthropological 
linguistics posed the question "How do we account for the simultaneous sense we 
have of the unique and the universal in our fellow men?" (Joseph P Casagrande, 
"Linguistic Universals and Anthropology" in Greenberg 1963, p294). It is now joined 
by Chomsky's innatist ideas to form a broader and more powerful current: And the 
idea has been floated that Greenbergian probabiKstic universals (for example, "with 
overwhelmingly greater than chance frequency languages with SOV order are post-
positional") are absorbable within Chomsky's framework, as part of an evaluation 
measure for grammar. Indeed, a rapprochement between the two types of universals 
has been going on for some time (Smith and Wilson 1979, p260-264). 
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3.3. Generative Grammar, Universal Grammar 
and Linguistic Equality 
Generative granmiar, which ousted the various varieties of structuralism in the 1960s 
and 1970s, was characterised by tenets not merely favourable to the idea of the "deep" 
equality of languages, but which indeed sprang from this a priori supposition. Lan-
guage egalitarianism underlies the kind of thinking that makes the generative ap-
proach possible. Essentially a generative grammar is a system of rules which specifies 
what combinations of such basic elements as phonemes, morphemes, etc are per-
missible or well-formed. This grammar thus generates (or defines as grammatical) all 
the well-formed sentences of a language and fails to generate (or declares the 
ungrammaticaUty of) all the ill-formed combinations (Lyons 1987, p27-28). Thus the 
generative grammarian embarks on the huge task of describing the langue, the 
language system or linguistic competence of the native speaker; or, to put it another 
way, "of what is judged pretheoretically, and at some level of idealisation or abstrac-
tion, to be a given language community.". 
This task thus involves getting "the best fit that is possible between the sentences of 
the language generated by the grammar and the utterances (ie the actual or potential 
instances of parole) that might be produced, understood and accepted as normal by 
the members of the language community in question" (ibid. p28). It would also be 
curious, or even unbelievable, if the various langues were somehow unequal, or of 
unequal interest to the linguistic scholar. 
An equally large and pertinent legacy of Chomskyan linguistics has been the assertion 
that the human language faculty is innate and unique (Cook 1933, Ch.I). Innateness 
points umnistakably towards language equality in the initial state of the child's 
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language faculty. Uniqueness also leads towards equality, but by exclusion. For it 
excludes, say, animal systems of communication, the dancing of bees, the wise thrush, 
sagacious owl and so on. All these fascinating creatures indubitably conmiunicate, 
but Chomsky would counter that communication is not the essence of human lan-
guage (And perhaps, therefore, that a communicative approach to the teaching of 
language quite misses a vital formal quality of language: Smith and Wilson 1979, 
p266). Amongst the many discrepancies between animal communication and human 
languages the absence of rule-governed creativity in the former is the most distinctive: 
Animal messages are finite and stimulus controlled. Descartes observed 
"... there are none so depraved and stupid ... that they cannot arrange 
different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make 
known their thoughts, while... there is no animal... which can do the same". 
And Bertrand Russell notes 
"No matter how eloquently a dog may bark, he cannot tell you his parents 
were poor but honest" (Fromkin and Rodman 1988, pl9-23). 
In this respect Chomsky stands at the end of a long and disparate historical Une which 
has underscored human brotherhood by insisting on quahtative distinctions between 
humanity and other sentient creatures. One should recall here that Chomsky himself 
has denounced animal experimentation of the kind used to underwrite behaviourism, 
since all creatures may suffer even if they possess no language faculty. 
An important and, I think, a telling point about language universals are their arbi-
trariness. Their universality does not derive from universally recurring properties of 
logic, thought or reality. Chomsky feels that universality resides in (inherited) formal 
characteristics of language, and the type of rules that their description demands, and 
does not lie in the relations that hold between language and the world (Lyons 1981, 
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p232). By divorcing the universality of language from other allegedly universal human 
traits (of character and thought) that were once supposed to underhe it, Chomsky 
greatly strengthened linguistic egalitarianism, though conceivably at the expense of 
other aspects of human equality. Against this it may well be urged that while "human 
nature" shows distressingly variable manifestations, from Primo Levi to the Nazis, the 
very solidity of formal properties of languages provides a reassuring benchmark for 
the assertion of one piece of evidence for iimate human equaUty. 
3.4. The Biological Foundations of Language Equality: 
The Lenneberg Thesis 
Small wonder, therefore, that Chomsky sought succour for his general notions by 
harking back to the biological and psychological make-up of human beings. For in 
biology is to be found much apparent support for the contention that 
"there is surely no reason today for taking seriously the view that attributes 
a complex human achievement entirely to months (or at most years) of 
experience, rather than to millions of years of evolution or to principles 
of neural organisation that may be even more deeply grounded in physical 
law" (Chomsky 1965, p5). 
Lenneberg underwrites this theory with "five empirically verifiable general biological 
premises" (Lermeberg 1967, p371-374). These are 
1 Cognitive function is species specific 
2 Specific properties of cognitive function are rephcated in every mem-
ber of the species. Cognitive processes and potentialities are repUcated 
for all species members (but note that this holds only for what an 
individual does, not what he is capable of doing). 
3 At birth man is relatively immature: certain aspects of his behaviour 
and cognitive functions emerge only during infancy. Human children's 
postnatal state of maturity is less advanced than that of other primates. 
4 Certain social phenomena among animals come about by spontaneous 
adaptation of the behaviour of the growing individual to the behaviour 
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of other individuals around him. Adequate environment includes not 
merely nutritive and physical conditions, but for many creatures spe-
cific social conditions and specific stimuU (eg certain action patterns in 
a mother, a sexual partner etc). For humans the right kind of stimula-
tion must occur in the narrow formative period of infancy; if it does not 
subsequent development may be irreversibly distorted. But note that 
the prerequisite social triggering mechanism will not shape social 
behaviour in the way that Emily Post may shape the manners of a 
debutante (ibid. p374). 
The enormous significance of all this for linguistic equality is at once apparent. 
Leimeberg inclines to the untestable view that language depends on cognition, rather 
than the other way round and that "cognitive function" is a more basic and primary 
process than language. Does this crucially matter for our conception of linguistic 
equality? I think not, for there is nothing in the idea that necessarily demands that the 
human language faculty does not structurally depend, and possibly yield chronological 
priority to, the human cognitive faculty. Some "egalitarian" thinkers have favoured or 
implied language priority, some cognitive priority, and some like Humboldt, have 
argued for simultaneity. 
Lermeberg then presses forward by characterising his underlying cognitive function 
as a modification of "a ubiquitous process (among vertebrates) of categorisation and 
extraction of similarities" (ibid). Language perception and production is actually 
reducible to categorisationprocesses (ibid. p271-272). Moreover, particular "speciali-
sations in peripheral anatomy and physiology account for some of the universal 
features of natural languages" (though the primacy of the cerebral factor in language 
behaviour is attested by the very fact that languages competence is attainable even 
by individuals with broad peripheral anomalies) (ibid. p375). 
Furthermore, biologically determined human cognitive quahties severely restrict the 
possible variations in natural languages: infinite variation is possible within outer 
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limits. This notion is obviously pertinent in that it implies that the "surface" forms of 
languages may be hugely diverse, but that "deep" underlying types remain constant. 
The language readiness of the child is a state of latent language structure, while the 
restricted development of language transforms this into a realised structure. Len-
neberg views this as, perhaps, a biologically-based formulation of the ancient distinc-
tion between universal and particular grammar. 
"He that understands grammar in one language, understands it in another as far as 
the essential properties of grammar are concerned. The fact that he caimot speak, 
nor comprehend, another language is due to the diversity of words and their various 
forms, but these are accidental properties of grammar" (Roger Bacon 1214-1294) 
(Fromkin and Rodman 1988, p388). 
Latent (or, in our terms equal or equivalent) structure thus becomes responsible for 
the underlying UG. Realisation entails: 
(a) performance pecuHarities 
(b) the unique features of the particular grammar of any natural language (Len-
neberg 1967, p376). Thus cognitive/biological equality would only exist at the 
"deepest" (and most fundamental) level, a notion we have frequently en-
countered in different forms (Lenneberg 1967, Table 9.2, p388, for variations 
and constancies of natural languages). Since the initial language capacity (or 
latent language structure) of all humans is the same, this view leads directly and 
decisively to a powerful statement of "fundamental" or "deep" linguistic equaUty. 
Just as importantly, it also leads us straight to the conclusion that all children are 
linguistically equal. For it is language, not speech, that is based on biology (Fromkin and 
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Rodman 1988, p388). Deaf children acquire a non-spoken language because language 
acquisition does not spring from the capacity to produce and hear sounds, but on a 
highly abstract cognitive ability, biologically determined, which accounts for the 
remarkable similarities between spoken and sign languages (ibid. p384). Moreover, 
language maturation ("the traversings of highly unstable states") is seen as a series of 
disequilibria which may lead from this state of initial equaUty to an unequal maturity. 
Though Leimeberg does not address this issue, he holds to the critical period 
hypothesis, in which a steady state is reached in the early teens, and "the cognitive 
processes are firmly entrenched, and the capacity for primary language synthesis is 
lost, and cerebral reorganisation of function is no longer possible" (Lenneberg 1967, 
p376-377). For some this process might seem to provide a linguistic parallel to the 
story of the Creation and Fall, or another way of expressing Rousseau's "Man is born 
free but is everywhere in chains". Certainly language users appear to start equal, but 
everywhere seem to become unequal. Biology lends support to a notion of language 
equality in the initial state; or perhaps, following Lenneberg, we should say infant 
cognitive capacities as they relate to language. Because it is the biologically-given 
cognitive and language structures within each healthy child, rather than language 
equality per se, which is at stake here. The repUcation of language structure in each 
child, and the fact that every language must possess an identical inner form (despite 
boundless surface variety) means that all languages have the same basic syntax: 
"utterances consist of concatenated morphemes and the concatenation is 
never random. Words and morphemes are always assignable to functional 
categories; sentences in all languages may be judged as grammatically 
acceptable or unacceptable by criteria of underlying structure" (Len-
neberg 1967, p381). 
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This is the language equality that explains language equipotentiality in children: that 
is, the undisputed ability of all normal children to learn any natural language (and 
probably non-natural ones too, hke sign language or Esperanto). Thus the deep 
identicality of languages reflects the identicahty of human biological makeup. To 
many this notion will seem both theoretically satisfying and morally cheering. And, 
of course, it also goes some way to establishing a particular notion of language equahty 
as an empirically justifiable concept; or, at least, an overwhelmingly probable one. 
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Chapter 4 
The Equality of Language and 
the Quality of Learners 
4.1. Age and Language Equality 
The spectre of aging has haunted the history of the idea of linguistic equaUty. It will 
almost certainly continue to do so, despite furious attempts to exorcise it. Indeed, we 
may go further and say that the shadow of the child lies, often unnoticed, over most 
aspects of language study. The mystery of how a child can possibly acquire a language 
inspired much of modern linguistics. And the child and her genetically determined 
human language faculty (for simplicity labelled UG) indominatably continues to 
assert her position in both theory and practice. 
4.2. The Decline of the Critical Period Hypothesis and 
Adult Language Learning Equality 
Another underlying presence has been the desire to cormect: to connect language to 
meaningful generalisations about the wider world, to connect particular to universal. 
Now we turn from a consideration of the properties of languages to one of the 
characteristics of language learners. The strongest thread in such a connection would 
be spun by a theory which showed that the child's initial and egalitarian language state 
is, to some degree, shared by the grown child. The adult comes, not in utter nakedness 
or entire forgetfulness, but trailing clouds of iimate grammatical universality. 
For many years this view seemed untenable. Generative grammarians, following 
Chomsky, leaned towards the idea that a child's brain is plastic by comparison with 
an adults. Penfield wrote influentially in 1959 that, prior to the age of 9-12 a child is 
"a specialist in learning to speak. At that age he can learn two or three languages as 
easily as one." But after this age "for the purposes of learning languages, the human 
brain becomes progressively stiff and rigid" (Penfield and Roberts 1959, p235-236). 
This kind of neurological argument sprang from clinical studies of aphasia, and the 
amazing speed with which children (but not always adults) recover speech capacity 
after injury or disease destroys the speech areas in the dominant left cerebral 
hemisphere (Harley 1986, p4). 
Such ideas were grist to the innatist mill, since they tended to diminish the role of the 
language environment severely, and upgraded the part played by natural endowment. 
Chomsky (1965), McNeill (1966) and Lenneberg (1967) all pressed the innatist case 
with vigour. And writers in this tradition were at the forefront of the movement for 
language equality and for the equality of the child learners' language faculties. 
Lermeberg argues persuasively that despite the "enormous variety of environmental 
conditions" the age of the onset of certain speech and language capacities is relatively 
unaffected (Lenneberg 1967, pl39). He suggests that there may well be a universal 
age for speech onset, and cites, when criticising the notice of a "primitive" language, 
the comment that those aspects of Russian morphology and syntax which Russian 
children learn after entering school are both infrequently and wrongly used in 
discourse. Lenneberg concludes by supporting a biologically based critical period of 
language acquisition between the ages of 2 and 13. 
Generativist emphasis on the richness and uniqueness of the child's language faculty, 
a faculty distinct from other cognitive capacities, and activated in diverse environ-
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ments despite degenerate and confusing input, fitted quite neatly with the biological 
C[ritical] P[eriod] H[ypotheses]. But it does not require or even imply it. Lenneberg 
fully accepts that an adult can learn to communicate in a second language, but believes 
that the route pursued will be different and that success, far from being absolutely 
certain, will be doubtful. And 
"the cerebral organisation for language learning has taken place during 
childhood, and since natural languages tend to resemble one another in 
many fundamental respects ... the matrix for language skills is present" 
(Lenneberg 1967, pl76). 
By contrast to the child's "automatic acquisition from mere exposure" language must 
now be taught and learned through a tediously conscious process. And biologically 
determined child/adult similarity in language equipotentiality is damaged by the 
proposition that 
"the biological fact of adulthood is enough to establish an insurmountable 
obstacle in most cases for complete language acquisition. The incomplete-
ness of the adult learners L2 system has a physiological basis and concomi-
tant cognitive correlates" (Harley 1986, p7). 
Subsequent research has suggested that the critical period does not coincide with 
brain lateralisation (which may be complete at 5) and that the brain has achieved 90% 
of its adult values by the age of 6. Only in phonology do children seem to have an 
immense advantage over adult learners; and the latter often have the edge in learning 
vocabulary. The dechne of behaviouristically based contrastive analysis, with its 
narrow focus on Mother Tongue interference, which also tended to privilege children 
over aduhs, has also left the biological CPH looking pretty battered. Children may 
indeed come to language by a different route to adults, but this does not entail that 
the two language faculties are different. 
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Terminologically, this is treacherous ground. We shall have cause to examine very 
different approaches to the question of the alleged similarity of C[hild] L[anguage] 
A[cquisition] and S[econd] L[anguage] A[cquisition]. And it seems that the acquisi-
tionprocess itself may have a heavy bearing on the question of language equahty. We 
might say we "know" about language equality not merely from a static "initial language 
faculty", but by back-hypothesising through our struggle to understand why language 
exists at all and how it comes to be acquirable and transmissible. And, analogically, 
we may back-hypothesise further from parallel knowledge about the existence, 
acquirability and transmissibility of second languages. Fundamentally, the shaky 
nature of the neurophysiological evidence for a critical period allows us to hold that 
there may be enough similarities between CLA and SLA for the broad conception of 
linguistic equality to encompass them both. 
The barricade formed by a biologically rooted CPH to a linguistically equal second 
language faculty is therefore largely demolished. Evidence does not suggest that UG 
is "consumed" in childhood. Excepting phonology, adults can do as well or better than 
children in SLA. If it may be assumed that there is a "single mechanism for learning 
languages" (Ellis 1985, p201) we have reverted to a singularly egalitarian position, not 
merely between adults and children, but between adults and adults as far as their 
linguistic faculties go. 
4.3. The Cognitive Critical Period and the Equality of Learners 
Cognitively based CPH's constitute little threat to the idea of an equal language 
faculty in both children and grown-ups. Indeed, they may powerfully underwrite the 
hypothesis. For Piaget "cognitive development is in principle both autonomous from 
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language development and causally prior to it" (Fletcher and Garman, 1986, pU). 
Language is neither necessary nor sufficient for cognitive development. Vigotsky, by 
contrast, felt that thought and language interact, and that thought is neither inde-
pendent of language, or causally prior to it. Krashen and others have built on Piaget's 
ideas by positing that the growing abihty of the young adult to construct hypotheses 
may stunt the learner's "natural" language acquisition capacity. 
The adult's desire to have a conscious knowledge of language may be just 
what prevents him from attaining full competence: it is quite difficult to 
express all of a language in terms of isolated rules. Thus the adult may be 
limited by his ability to describe language to himself (Harley 1986, p9). 
Krashen conjectures that interference error is commoner in the intensely self-con-
scious correctitude-oriented period of adolescence than in unselfconscious child-
hood. This kind of theorising leaves intact the possibility of an equal language faculty 
in children and adults. Indeed, the entire monitor model has many implications for 
language equality. For Krashen language acquisition is quite distinct from learning 
about a language, and is a "subconscious process identical in all important ways to the 
process children utilise in acquiring their first language" (Krashen 1985, p3). Adult 
acquirers have recourse to the same LAD as children. Indeed, in Krashen, the 
language faculty itself is virtually identified with unconscious acquisition, though 
Chomsky himself had pictured it as merely one amongst several "mental organs" that 
co-operate with each other and with language input to achieve competence 
(McLaughhn 1987,p23). The LAD thus only appHes to the initial state, prior to 
language input. Interestingly, and contentiously, Krashen broadens this idea to 
embrace a "device" possessed by adults too, although often severely hampered in its 
operation by the affective factors he describes. Chomsky himself initially believed in 
the atrophication of the human language faculty, with adult learners having to rely on 
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other mental capacities. But he now holds a view closer to Krashen, and the latter 
argues that the distinction between "cognize" and "know" is similar to that between 
"acquire" and "learn". 
4.4. Universal Grammar, Second Language Acquired 
The power and prestige of Chomsky is such that his altered position on these matters 
has issued in renewed interest in language universals and SLAD UG is focussed on 
abstract and linguistically significant principles that are believed to underlie all 
natural languages. They thus comprise "the essential language facihty with which all 
individuals are in general uniformity and equally endowed" (McLaughlin 1987, p23-24). 
Chomsky's most recent contributions have emphasised a parameter setting model of 
language. This model strives to account for: 
(a) language diversity 
(b) the speedy and uniform growth of child languages in accordance with 
certain patterns. 
The language faculty, intrinsic in us all, is both unique to us and uniform for all of us 
(Flynn and O'Neill 1988, p77). UG theory must 
"be compatible with the diversity of existing ... grammars [and] be suffi-
ciently constrained and restrictive in the options it permits so as to account 
for the fact that each of these grammars develops in the mind on the basis 
of quite limited evidence" (Chomsky 1981, p3). 
Universals and innateness are again two of the most productive and revealing areas 
and the ones which bear most pertinently on the equaUty of learner's language 
capacities. The explosion of interest in first language acquisition research occurred 
in response to Chomsky's 1959 review of Skinner, asserting that much of grammar is 
irmate and that therefore all languages are, in some profound sense, the same. Many 
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still believe that UG "will eventually explain all of the significant structural and 
semantic aspects of child grammar" (Newmeyer 1988, I I , p35). 
Children's early hypotheses about language will thus be structure dependent. And 
structure dependence here means that "experienced language will be analysed in 
terms of an abstract representation of sentence stimuli" (Newmeyer 1988, p55). The 
principles of structure dependence are not learned, but an essential precondition of 
language learning. Thus, forming and producing an utterance is, for the child, not 
merely a matter of putting words in a particular sequence: Rather, "every sentence 
has an inaudible internal structure which must be understood by the learner" (New-
meyer 1988, p55). L i learning also involves a biologically predetermined deductive 
component, through which given principles and parameters are apphed to the struc-
ture dependent encounter with input. It is precisely this underlying structure depend-
ency, this underlying sameness, which constitutes UG's contribution to notion of 
language learner equahty. Work on parameters, in the last decade, have fortified the 
idea that they are part of the universal competence for first and second language 
acquisition. 
Workers in the Chomskyan vineyard have thus extended UG from L i to L2, and have 
pinpointed several areas. These include the waning of the "narrow" CPH; interlan-
guage theory; the need the L2 learner has to construct complicated grammars on the 
basis of insufficient and deficient data. As for children, some structures are so unusual 
and peripheral that learners can scarcely have adequate exposure to them. Wrong 
hypotheses demand detailed negative feedback if they are to be repudiated, but they 
often do not get it. And, as with L i the grammar rules are incredibly abstract, and do 
not merely mirror surface structures (McLaughlin 1987, p91-92). Observations of this 
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kind powerfully stimulated interest in the possible presence of underlying universals 
of SLA which might have comparable significance to those operative for the child 
acquirer. 
Learning, in this school of thinking, is thus a highly misleading term for language 
development. Cook notes that 
"a bulb becomes a flower; some cells become a lung. We do not say that 
the bulb 'learns' to be a flower or the cells 'learn' to be a lung, although 
in both cases certain aspects of the environment such as water and 
nourishment are necessary to the process. Instead, we say the bulb and 
cells 'grow'. Their growth is the realisation of their genetic potential in 
conjunction with 'triggers' from the environment, the achievement of 
something that was within them from the start..." (Cook 1985, p3-4). 
And Chomsky has observed that "a central part of what we called 'learning' is actually 
better understood as the growth of cognitive structures along an internally directed 
course under the triggering and potentially shaping effects of the environment. But, 
of course, Chomsky speaks only of competence in language. Thus acquisition alludes 
only to a speaker's knowledge of language, stripped of all maturational and processing 
restrictions, defects of memory and all motivational and cognitive factors too. These 
collectively make up a child's "channel capacity", the ability to make sense of infor-
mation, and are excluded. The hnguistic faculty is there, ab initio, intact and perfect. 
Variable, and therefore de-equahsing non-linguistic factors, do affect its actual 
operation. And thus in Chomskyan thought it is this inborn faculty which captures 
and represents the essential similarity of all learners/acquirers (McLaughlin 1987, 
p94) 
Parameter theory has opened up another sweeping vista for the ever-widening 
horizon of Hnguistic equahty. 
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UG theory holds that the speaker knows a set of principles that apply to 
all languages, and parameters that vary within clearly defined limits from 
one language to another. Acquiring language means learning how these 
principles apply to a particular language and which value is appropriate 
for each parameter. Each principle of language that is proposed is a 
substantial claim about the mind of the speaker and the nature of acquisi-
tion ... the importance of UG is its attempt to integrate grammar, mind 
and acquisition at every moment (Cook 1988, pl-2) 
Essentially, then, each speaker's set of principles and parameters are fundamentally 
the same. "Experience is required to set the switches. Once they are set, the system 
functions" (McLaughlin 1987, p94-95). By these presumptions it would be odd, even 
incredible, if each speaker's intrinsic capacities were not identical. But since the 
system will work automatically once input (however sparse, low quality or muddled) 
have set the switches, it would be equally unbelievable, in this latest twist of Chom-
sky's thought, if the speakers linguistic capacity did not remain equal, or even 
identical, after switch-setting has occurred 
UG asserts that at some fundamental level all languages conform to a 
particular pattern ... Their uniformity is not due to common historical 
origins, nor to the communicative needs of the user, but to the properties 
of the language faculty, the UG at the heart of grarmnatical competence 
... knowledge of a language means knowing how it fits the general proper-
ties of UG with which the mind is equipped. We don't know English as 
such, or Arabic as such: we know the English version of UG or the Arabic 
version of UG (Cook 1988, p50). 
The process sketched here deals only with "core" grammar: those pieces of linguistic 
competence created in the child via the interaction of UG and input. But many aspects 
of grammar are peripheral: these are not constrained by UG. Peripheral rules are 
often historically determined ("the more the merrier" is derived from Old English), 
are borrowed or are accidental. But although peripheral (marked) rules may be 
harder to learn that core (unmarked) ones, all languages are alike in that they possess 
both types of rule, and are also alike in that the relationships, or properties, of core 
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to peripheral are broadly similar interlingually. A language which was largely com-
posed of peripheral (and hence unbounded and unpredictable) rules would not be a 
language at all in the Chomskyan sense: it would be bereft of the property of 
learnability. Hence the core/periphery distinction offers no real threat to any of our 
component elements of linguistic equality. 
The associated notion of markedness draws the same kind of comment. Generally, 
marked structures are labelled idiosyncratic, irregular, rare, less transferable (to a 
second language) and more intricate; unmarked ones are more easily learnable, by 
only a minimal exposure to evidence. It has been further contended, though by no 
means proved, that unmarked forms are more easily - though not necessarily earUer 
- acquired by second language learners. It is quite possible that further research will 
falsify this claim, but anything approaching verification would be a great leap forward 
towards the goal of showing the L2 learner to be in full or partial possession of initial 
UG and therefore subject, in some degree, to the same generahsable language 
equality as the child (McLaughhn 1987, p97-98). Interlanguage research could well 
be tending in such a comparably decisive direction (Ellis 1985, p201-206). Com-
parative analysis of CLA and SLA may well forge the key which locks the door against 
assertion of linguistic inequality. 
4.5. The Innateness Debate: Equality and Inequality in SLA 
No consensus stalks these pages, but a certain yearning for one will probably be 
detectable. Nor shall we discover much in the area of SLA and language innateness. 
Perhaps the only area in which an appearance of agreement is visible is that of the 
magnitude of the child's achievement. The absorption and production of the delicate-
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ly intricate systems that underlie all languages and the normal child's capability to 
absorb and produce unerringly and with great celerity constitute a powerful case for 
children's linguistic equality. 
Uniformities in the output ... [of the learner] must be ascribed to the 
structure of the [language acquisition] device if they cannot be shown to 
be the result of uniformities in the language the learner hears. (Chomsky 
1961, p207) 
However, the attempt to extend the innately endowed qualities of the child to adult 
learners has met with incredulous opposition. Corder's remark that the "processes of 
first and second language acquisition may very well be the same" (Corder, in Schacter 
1988, p23) has sparked an animated but highly inconclusive debate. Diagrammatically 
and maybe simpUstically, this is expressible thus (Cook 1988, pl82-183) 
With access to U . G . Indirect access to U.G. No access to U.G. 
U . G . U . G . U . G . Other mental faculties 
L i competence 
L i competence L2 competence L2 competence L i competence L2 competence 
Eiquality Inequality 
Actually the extreme points on this continuum are not really occupied. Cook and 
Schacter, who join battle here, would both probably wish to take up positions on the 
left and right of centre respectively. Cook thinks that UG's relevance lies "not so much 
in the uncertain analogy to L i learning as in the original conundrum of the poverty 
of the stimulus" (Cook 1985, p9). If the L2 learner grasps that * "is the programme 
that on television is good?" is ungrammatical, and if this knowledge is not derivable 
from experience, that intuition must be innate. Research focussing on the celebrated 
"easy/eager to please" puzzle is employed to show that adult learners' perception of 
the structural difference is not ascribable to "teaching syllabuses, structural exercises 
or pedagogical grammars, and [that] ... it is improbable that native speakers have 
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demonstrated it to the L2 learner". Thus inherent cerebral qualities must account for 
this insight. 
This seems to me the most potent of the battery of arguments in favour of an adult 
access to the language faculty. Given the extreme abstractness of grammatical rules, 
it would be impossible for anyone to learn a language without pre-existing linguistic 
knowledge. Amongst protagonists of the adult UG position there is a strong tendency 
to assimilate L i and L2 acquisition. Cook for example, admits that the two processes 
are not absolutely identical, but are similar "when situational and cognitive factors 
are ruled out". Chomsky himself has challenged the idea that the L i might be a 
mediator or link to UG, but Cook defends this notion, at least in a weakened form. 
Chomskyan acquisition, or ideal language learning, means that real-time sequences 
of development can tell us nothing about acquisition. 
Schacter's strictures are levelled principally against the assimilationist hypothesis. 
She fully accepts the persuasive force of mentalism, but counters that the Unguistic 
attainments of L2 learners are so staggeringly different from those of children that it 
is quite preposterous to imagine that the underlying processes could be the same. Her 
vigorous critique falls principally in two areas: 
First, completeness. Any two normal L i learners soon achieve perfectly complete 
competence, notwithstanding variable performance. But scarcely any L2 learners ever 
approach anything like indistinguishabihty from L i speakers: Perhaps no L2 learner 
can ever reach the native speaker's normal state of grammatical competence. Schac-
ter even suggests that L2 learners merely accumulate more native-like syntactic 
patterns. While going some way with Schacter here, her conclusions remain disput-
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able and the accumulating evidence suggests at least a shadowy presence of UG in 
adults. 
Second, equipotentiality. Small children are equipotential for any language - they can 
acquire any natural language with equal speed and facility. But the case is utterly 
different for adults, who are not equipotential for any language. A Spanish speaker 
finds English more difficult than French, a Dutch speaker less, and all experience 
more difficulty acquiring Japanese than each others' language. Even in the lexicon 
there are significant variations in the speed and difficulty of learning. While these 
points may shake our faith in the "back to UG" stance, they do not, to my mind, 
critically damage the "start with L i " standpoint, since learned L i could obviously 
retard or accelerate L2 acquisition (Schacter 1988, p225-226). 
One origin of the non-equipotentiality of the adult learner is quite manifestly previous 
knowledge: this produces effects like avoidance, underproduction, time lags and 
speed ups. "Fossilised" ungrammaticalities also occur incessantly in adult learners, 
but in a quite different way in children. Schacter believes that it was the mysteriously 
extraordinary nature of child language acquisition that generated Chomsky's original 
hypothesis. The patchier and more humdrum and immeasurably less successful 
phenomenon of adult learning, with its issue in, at best, imperfection, demands a far 
less potent hypothesis to make it comprehensible. She summons Chomsky to her side, 
and avers that resemblances between child and adult learners in such areas as 
morphemes, negations and error types may be due, not to a linguistic faculty, but to 
"quite disparate cognitive systems that interweave in normal cognitive development." 
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In sum, it is still not patently absurd to assert that the L2 learner has some kind of 
direct or oblique access to the universal language faculty which partakes of a similar 
equality to that we have upheld for the child: the child enjoys normal access to UG; 
the adult an obscured and abnormal vision of it. The lack of correspondence between 
IQ scores and language learning "ability" (Spolsky 1989, pl02-104) may actually 
entitle us to hold that SLA does exhibit and embody a kind of equality which 
transcends the notable differences in adult learning capacities in other cognitive 
areas. This view entails not merely assenting to the idea of adults still having an intact 
but distant and muddled UG, but also to the notion that language learning is not like 
our other "academic" educational experiences at all. For, as Chomsky notes, teachers 
could try "to create a rich linguistic environment for the intuitive heuristics that the 
normal human being automatically possesses". 
Over and above all this, we may conjecture that (linguistic) science advances (or 
perhaps merely changes) not through the rigorous formulation and testing of theory, 
but through the presentation of new ways of thinking about the world. Such an insight 
was expressed by Chomsky in 1965 
It seems plain that language acquisition is based on the child's discovery 
of what from a formal point of view is a deep and abstract theory - a 
generative grammar of his language - many of the concepts and principles 
of which are only remotely related to experience by long and intricate 
chains of quasi-inferential steps. 
The formalism, the emphasis upon depth and abstractness, all these derive from the 
dawning realisation that, whatever the Babel-Hke confusion of languages, language is 
a universal and equal human possession. The crucial insight, still productive of many 
more, is thus that of linguistic equality, which both underlies and accounts for the 
formality, depth and abstractness of all languages. 
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Chapter 5 
Exemplifications, Arguments, 
Conclusions 
5.1. Gender, Race and Class 
Temporal and spatial constraints have dictated that full justice has not been done to 
all the parameters of language equality. In particular the significance of intralingual 
equality has not had its due. To many it will appear a bewildering paradox that linguists 
could pay lip service to a formal and functional equality obtaining between different 
languages, and yet ignore or deny that such equaUty was equally apparent between 
varieties of the same language. Recent work has turned the tide. On gender variations 
most feminist writers would probably agree that it makes little sense to speak of the 
langue as "man-made"; yet gender variations in parole are endemic. All the evidence 
points towards an equal language faculty in men and women. The biological 
endowment (with, from our standpoint, unimportant laryngeal differences) is the 
same, and the formal equality stems from that. Functionally, too, "female" and "male" 
language may be said to have an equal potential and, maybe, actual expressiveness 
(Newmeyer 1988, IV, p75) 
More contentious, and more volatile, has been the issue of race, class and language. 
Assumptions about racial, social and national superiority are not absent from the 
history of linguistics, though they may well be cleverly concealed. Until quite recently 
it would have been impossible to assert the formal, let alone the functional equaUty 
of, say B[lack] E[ngHsh] V[ernacular], or the despised industrial speech patterns of 
Birmingham or Tyneside and be taken seriously. There seem to be a complex 
hierarchy of dialects in most languages studied. The vast majority of people in Europe 
still probably accept the old prescriptionist illusions about the superiority of one 
dialect over another. Long ago Sapir (perhaps infeUcitously) expressed the formal 
equality of dialects. 
"When it comes to linguistic form, Plato walks with the Macedonian 
swineherd, Confucius with the head hunting savage of Assam" (Sapir 1921, 
p219). 
But it was not until the 1970s that Labov and others finally nailed the myth that some 
language varieties are both formally and functionally inferior to others; an assumption 
inadvertently buttressed by the work of Bernstein and Farrell and knowingly by that 
of Jensen, where arguments for black children's genetic intellectual inferiority were 
tricked out by fallacious "evidence" drawn from blacks' language. The 1972 resolution, 
passed by the Linguistic Society of America and composed by Kroch and Labov, 
brilliantly exposed this erroneous and disturbing tendency. Labov, in his celebrated 
essay "The Logic of Non-Standard English" had already shown, conclusively to my 
mind, that BEV, and by implication all non standard forms of any language, are just 
as logical and abstract as any other variety, and therefore able to perform a 
comparable range of functions. 
These contributions marked such a watershed that they deserve to be quoted at 
length. In their declaration Kroch and Labov, commencing with an assertion of 
intralingual equality, note that children learn, without being taught, the grammar of 
their native language; that no language yet examined is conceptually or logically more 
primitive, inadequate or deficient than any other. But they continue by noting that 
the non-standard dialects of English spoken by lower class families in the 
inner cities of the United States are fully formed languages with all of the 
grammatical structure necessary for logical thought... linguists agree that 
all children who have learned to speak a human language have a capacity 
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for concept formation beyond our present power to analyse (Kroch and 
Labov 1972, pl7-18). 
Other writers have begun, after a neglect stretching throughout the history of 
linguistics, to document the expressive capabilities of non-standard language 
varieties: While it is probably easier to demonstrate the more easily definable notions 
like logicality or abstractness, or even of functional efficacy and stylistic variety, it is 
harder to prove equality in aesthetic notions like literary and evocative power. 
Translation, say, of Shakespeare into BEV may go some way towards this. It would 
be foolish to claim that all will one day agree that literary "masterpieces" are 
translatable into any language variety with no loss of literary force, but to the doubters 
we must say: Why on earth not? If we accept that one piece of a particular language 
may be translated into another with no necessary loss of aesthetic significance, then 
why should any variety of language not be adequate for this? 
Most linguists argue for the equal logicality and complexity of all natural language 
varieties. From this fundamental equality springs their equal potential expressiveness 
and worth. But, of course, it may well be advantageous for every individual to have 
some command of several dialects of any language; but even here the advantage 
derives, in part, from prejudice against the allegedly limited potentialities of 
unprestigious and stigmatised forms. Thus prejudice quickly draws a vicious spiral. 
Lack of prestige makes a particular variety less useful or acceptable; and hence users 
are umeasonably forced to acquire others. And, to pursue this a little further, equality 
will also be possessed, not merely by dialects, sociolects and such collective concepts, 
but by idiolects, the linguistic range of a single individual. For it is too easy to forget 
that language equaUty is instantiated in every human being. 
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5.2. Language Birth and Language Death 
Pidgins and Creoles are another richly rewarding area. Pidgins, created in unequal 
multilingual contact situations, are clearly not the equal of "real" language in their 
complexity, and therefore in their range of functions. A pidgin is bom when two 
structurally and semantically equivalent language systems are crudely and often 
cruelly thrust together in highly exploitive or unequal situations: slavery is merely the 
most extreme of these. Although they are logical and rule-governed their restricted 
uses in communicating only with members of other speech communities ensures a 
reduction in complexity; and therefore a depleted capacity for embodying ideas, 
emotions and so on. 
What eventually happens at the birth of a new natural language, when a pidgin 
becomes creolised and acquires native speakers, is that the pidgins become "ordinary 
languages like any others" (Holman 1988, pl54-155). And this "instant acquisition" of 
logicality, complexity and underlying abstractness derives from the creative equality 
of children's language faculties, as they transform reduced and restricted codes into 
fully humanised ones. 
Again, it would be presumptuous to claim an academic consensus. In Bickerton's 
"bioprogram" account Creoles are invented by children. Hearing {inter alia) the 
degenerate input of insufficiently structured and pragmatically penurious pidgins, 
they bring their inborn linguistic capacities to bear to remould this data into 
fully-fledged languages. But, while he still believes that similarities between different 
Creoles reflect the iimate language faculty, he has denied ascribing simplicity (and 
therefore presumably lack of complexity) to Creoles; commenting that "the whole 
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concept of simpUcity in language is strewn with epistemological and other landmines, 
and should perhaps be avoided altogether" (Hudson 1980, p67). SimpUcity, of course, 
may merely mean "closer to UG" and therefore free of the idiosyncrasies bestowed 
by diachronic change. In this sense it does not entail lack of structural complexity, and 
the bioprogram approach certainly does not invite us to treat Creoles as anything less 
than full languages. 
Other recent enquirers like Pieter Muysken contest the aUeged morphological and 
grammatical simplicity of Creoles. He outlines seven theories which try to account for 
the supposed properties of Creoles (similarity, simpUcity and mixed grammars). Of 
these, two do not attribute simplicity to Creoles at all, and we have contended that the 
bioprogram model does not imply simpUcity in a derogatory sense. Pointing to the 
fact that simplicity has been taken to mean (a) lacking in morphology and (b) having 
a simpler grammar, Muysken concludes that Creole grammars are neither especially 
simple or unmarked (Newmeyer 1988, I I , p302). We have already encountered the 
erroneous notion that analytic languages are less complex and less adequate than 
synthetic ones. The hydra of primitivism wiU always have more heads to sever. But 
the case for the formal and functional equality of Creoles has been convincingly made, 
and linguists increasingly treat them as languages like any other. 
Equally illuminating and pertinent is the process of language death. Attention has 
been called to the simUarities between dying languages, in their terminal stage before 
dissolution, and pidgins. Both are used monostylistically, and therefore become 
functionally inadequate to certain Unguistic situations (Muysken, ibid. p289). The 
sociolinguistic and pragmatic norms which govern styUstic choice have been lost in a 
terminally sick language, just as they have not yet been gained in a pidgin. And there 
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is the same impoverishment of grammar and lexicon, the decline of inflectional 
morphology, synthetic constructions and word formation rules. Even so, dying 
languages do seem closer to living ones in many ways than do pidgins. It is the loss of 
logicality and complexity, the increasing shakiness of that internal coherence which 
characterises a living language, which issues in the pragmatic and sociolinguistic 
poverty of a disappearing tongue. A living language is, after all, a language in which 
we can freely and comfortably think. To identify the exact point at which an 
endangered species becomes one doomed to extinction may be a pedantic question, 
but the theory of linguistic equality has much to offer in constructing satisfying 
explanations for these critical moments. All languages must change, slowly but 
ineluctably; change is thus a necessary for existence: but if change spells the loss of 
those features which make languages equal, extinction is not far away. 
And, in the context of newly minted languages, recent investigations of sign languages 
provide a refreshing reminder that the language faculty may not be dependent on 
speech at all. Bloomfield thought that gestural languages were secondary to speech 
(Newmeyer 1988, IV, pl88-189), but many now feel they are natural languages, 
analysable in the same way as others, and thus endowed with all the formal and 
functional values of non-sign languages (Bloomfield 1933, p39). It is the language, 
not the speech faculty, which is basic, as Sapir recognised in his sagacious delineation 
of the qualities of a language. 
That a language may be born at the very moment an infant restructures a structurally 
insufficient pidgin is perhaps the most striking testimony of all to the limitless creative 
power of children's brains. Conversely, language attrition begins at that moment when 
the possessor of a logically and structurally complete language loses command over 
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its full complexity. Of course, every language is probably losing speakers at any point 
in its history, but an individual speaker's disacquisition may rehearse global language 
death. This leads to an interesting and testable possibility: using criteria of logicality, 
regularity and complexity, it could be possible to test for language disacquisition. 
Even using a scalar approach it may be possible to find a particular point at which 
competence is too uneven to measure up to the standards of language equality. This 
could be another excellent way of demonstrating that logicality and complexity are 
core concepts when testing for the presence of a complete language (McCormack 
1990, passim). 
5.3. Thinking and Language 
Linguistic equality has sweeping impUcations for the question of language, culture 
and world view, for Unguistic determinism and linguistic relativism. Most evidently, 
it appears totally at variance with stronger forms of the so-caUed SapU-Whorf 
hypothesis: that language determines and dictates thought, that there can be no 
thought without language, and that consequently there are no real restrictions on the 
variations between people in the concepts they form. "We dissect nature along lines 
laid down by our native language" (Newmeyer 1988, I I , pl5). The burden of proofs 
marshalled thus far is heavily against this admittedly thought-provoking idea. Rather, 
the equality of our linguistic faculties and therefore of the languages it spawns, point 
to thought determining language and the essential translatability and even 
interchangeability of languages. These possibilities stem directly from the deep 
likenesses in the structural systems of all languages which in turn flows from our 
common humanity. Of course, it may well be true that highly dilute forms of 
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Whorfianism may be acceptable, but doubts persist, and the decline of linguistic 
determinism may be seen as an unconscious acknowledgement that it is irreconcilable 
with the universalist thrust of modern linguistics. And, no facet of thinking about the 
equalness of languages need discourage advocates of "Whorfianism of a third kind", 
an ethical relativism which defends the worth of despised languages and cultures to 
the rich and precious diversity of human experience (Whorf 1956, p207). Linguistic 
equality may well be a far more valuable defence for desirable variety, or, indeed, of 
an ideal world language, than any form of determinism. And it exposes the intellectual 
hoUowness of the ethnically and socially distorted treatment of languages so 
lamentably characteristic of much national language planning. 
5.4. Is Linguistic Equality an Angiocentric or Prescriptive Idea? 
Nearly everything so far has concerned the thoughts and writings of Europeans and 
North Americans. Indeed, the genesis of the ideas discussed seems to He in Europe 
and North America. Linguistics as we know it is a European and North American 
study which, like many others, seems set fair to colonise the entire intellectual world. 
But, at least from the time of Boas and his colleagues onwards (and sporadically much 
further back in time) much of the evidence for linguistic propositions has been drawn 
from non-European languages. Admittedly, the researchers often possessed far 
below a native-like competence in the languages studied. In sum, while we need to 
accept a Eurocentric and Americocentric bias in linguistic thinking, the claims made 
by this thinking may well have universal validity within the terms of linguistic theory. 
More than this could scarcely be demanded of any system of thought. 
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The question of ethnocentricity in linguistics has arisen in a rather different way with 
regard to language universals. We have argued that the notion of linguistic equaUty 
is both logically prior to, and more epistemologically embracing than, the daughter 
idea of language universals. It is possible to conceive of universals without linguistic 
equality, but not vice versa. Because of the Anglophonic monolingualism of some of 
the protagonists of both universals and generative grammar, these theories became 
easy targets for shallow allegations of presumptuous ethnocentricity. Defenders have 
not been slow to point the hyperbole behind some of the charges (Newmeyer 1988, 
p l5) . Since introspective judgments about grammaticality are much easier and safer 
in one's mother tongue, and since these judgments have been vital in generative 
grammar, it is easy to see how such suggestions might gain credence. 
I f generative grammar is right, each and every language will reveal a large part of the 
truth about languages, because all are fundamentally similar. The language faculty is 
precisely the same for all children and this similarity is reflected in the grammatical 
principles children possess. As Chomsky notes: "It is only through intensive studies 
of particular languages that one can hope to find crucial evidence for the study of 
universal grammar" (Newmeyer 1983, p68). Languages clearly do need to be studied 
in great depth and with enormous rigour. Otherwise "universal" principles could be 
deduced from the most perfunctory examination, which, fairly obviously, they cannot. 
In this respect, modern linguistics is like its founders: complex, demanding and 
difficult. 
Another suggestion, that anglocentricism has somehow determined the shape of 
grammatical theory, seems highly improbable. Newmeyer argues that the excessive 
permissiveness of Chomskyan theory constitutes an opposite deficiency. 
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Unquestionably, egalitarian and universalist ideologies do constitute a "Western" 
mode of thinking, though one which has now spread far and wide. 
One preoccupation of this dissertation has been the impossibility for any fruitful 
theory to be completely value-free. Generative grammarians can only escape "values" 
by taking refuge in secondary, and derivative, aspects of grammatical study. Our 
argument throughout has been that belief in the possibihty of language universals, 
and in the worthwhileness of studying them, and indeed the whole project of describing 
the underlying grammatical principles of a language - all these ultimately stem from 
highly "ideological" concerns. 
Frank acceptance of the hidden intellectual origins and agenda of modern linguistics 
is both necessary and desirable. Even i f concepts like logicality, regularity, complexity 
and abstractness were absolutely value- free, we should still have to defend the 
importance we attach to them, and argue for the significance of that idea of equality 
which binds them into a meaningful whole. 
I t would take a very militant linguistic determinist to hold that the idea of linguistic 
equality cannot be understood by those educated in non-Western ways of thought: 
And the idea does dignify all languages and invests them with equal worth and 
potential. Can we really therefore say, without self-contradiction (or at least without 
logical and psychological oddity) that a theory can be ethnocentric which does not 
favour its own language or ethnic group? To accuse anti-racists of racism because not 
everybody in the world agrees with anti-racism seems to be a bizarre accusation. I f 
the theory is wrong, it is not because it is ethnocentric. A far more plausible case might 
be made for the essential anti-ethnocentric impUcations of most modern linguistic 
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theory. Many linguistic conservatives (of, say, the prescriptive type) may dishke this, 
but, on this occasion, they cannot have their cake and eat it. 
But the relationship of theory to practice may well be equivocal. The way in which 
Chomsky, most notably, has actually formulated his ideas may unintentionally have 
favoured a kind of language prescription. 
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-Ustener, in 
a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language 
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as 
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and error 
(random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language to 
actual performance (Chomsky, ibid. p69). 
Undoubtedly, these ideal speaker-listeners have tended to be hnguists themselves, 
introspecting their own arid standard languages. This was an unfortunate, but 
accidental feature of some linguistic theory. But there is nothing at all in the theory 
which implies that the ideal speaker-listener should be a standard speaker; indeed, 
essentially transformational grammar is an anti-prescriptive force in the world of 
language (Chomsky 1965, p3). 
This is perhaps the place, i f any is, to note what, amongst lay people, is probably the 
commonest objection to language equality: that some languages (normally other 
peoples') do not possess enough words, or specialised-enough words to be treated as 
functionally equal to others. How frequently most of us have heard English lauded 
for its large vocabulary, sometimes with the impHcation that a language can be 
confined and captured within the covers of a dictionary. It is perfectly true that there 
is a minimal lexicon (or non-written signs) without which a language could be neither 
formally or functionally adequate; but every language must have this as soon as it 
acquires its first native speakers - the precise point, that is, at which it becomes a 
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language. Additional words are in fact already present; or rather the realities which 
they express are already there in the necessary conceptual and linguistic structure. 
Whilst Inuit may rejoice in five words for different varieties of snow, temperate 
lexicons can encompass this by distinguishing between wet, dry, melting etc. snow. 
Too often an essentially lexicocentric view of language blurs our awareness of the 
conceptual equality noted by Sapir in 1921. 
5.5. Linguistic Equalities Revisited 
Formal equality seems to be the irreducible kernel at the heart of the equality of 
languages. I t also seems to be the least debatable element of the tripartite theory. For 
it should be possible to demonstrate, at least to our own satisfaction, that every 
language has an equally logical, regular and complex internal pattern, even if such 
putative universaUstic norms are tainted by Eurocentric bias. 
The functional equality of languages is probably harder to establish. And it may be 
flawed by lack of diachronic comparability between languages, such as the absence 
of a written Hterature, the attrition of oral literary traditions and so on. Unwritten 
languages suffer a similar disadvantage to unwritten dialects in this respect. However 
much we may feel that the functional force of a language is predetermined by its 
formal quahties, the demonstration of this will be highly problematic. 
Equality of value will , a fortiori, be bedevilled by even greater doubt. For it is hard to 
exclude from our notion of worth such volatile concepts as Valuable for career, family, 
race, class, nation' and so on, and those muddy tributaries soon cloud the pure waters 
of linguistic thinking. Ironically, such opacity could well conspire towards the 
real-world death of our original notion. It is not beyond our imagination to conceive 
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a world in which all but few of our existing languages were extinct. Linguists debated 
the records of those perished tongues; anthropologists celebrated their cultural 
heritage; and all agreed that languages always were linguistically equal. 
5.6. Conclusion: Is Theory Worthwhile? 
Encounters with many aspects of Unguistic thought now enable us to propose a refined 
description of the theory of linguistic equaUty. 
1. The relations between sounds and meanings in all languages are equally 
arbitrary. But the internal relations between these signs form a consist-
ent and rule-governed system in every language. 
2. This universal interior linguistic regularity accounts for the creativity 
of all languages. A t any time in the history of language, most of the 
sentences, spoken and heard, have never been identically said or heard 
before. 
3. The granmiatical systems of all languages possess equivalent qualities. 
They can all, as a consequence, fully express any conceivable thought. 
4. A l l normal children have equal language acquiring capacities for any 
natural language. 
The foregoing pages have been a faltering struggle to come to grips with a hegemonic 
concept which seems to make sense of many features of both linguistics and language 
itself. Numerous exemplifications of the theory hopefully go a little way, and in the 
right direction, to answering our rhetorical question. Is the theory a good one? 
Harking back to the critical demand that any theory should satisfy searching norms, 
that satisfaction has now been attempted. The theory assists comprehension of both 
linguistic and social reality; it has predictive value and creates testable hypotheses; it 
is transformative, revolutionising our very idea of language. Further, i t is 
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observationally, descriptively and explanatorily adequate. And it is falsifiable. And, 
because of its empirical elements, it is hugely practical. 
Pedagogically, it has radically humanistic unpUcations for our disposition towards the 
learner. I t casts a powerful beam on critical contemporary issues like language 
standardisation, and highlights the choices with stark clarity. And, perhaps in common 
with all good theory, it is equivocal in many of its impUcations, clarifying conflicts 
rather than resolving them. For standardisation may be as easily attacked as defended 
via the theory. One multi-stylistic language could conceivably perform all the 
important tasks presently carried out by four and a half thousand with equal or greater 
ease and success. But, by a similar token, it lends no succour at all to the chauvinistic 
ideologists of various global languages. 
Ignorance forms a large part of all forms of bigotry, including prejudices about 
language. But, even after the miasma has been dispelled, decisions will not be 
sublimely simple. A final criterion for a decent theory is its capacity to be truthful to 
the complexities and contradictions of life. In this case such truthfulness will need to 
embrace consequences that, at first glance, may well appear astonishing. In the short 
term, wider acceptance of linguistic equality will lend dignity to all languages and 
varieties, with exciting effects on linguistic and human rights, and the legitimate self-
esteem of minorities. In the longer term, it could well issue in both the preservation 
of diversity and the growth in sympathy for the idea of a single world language, with 
its own varieties and normal propensity to change. Unbeknown to itself, linguistics 
seems to be travelling the same road as the natural and social sciences: towards a 
more sophisticated, more intricate but quite definite conception of human equality. 
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